This paper presents an experimental analysis of current Distributed Denial of Service attacks. Our analysis is based on real data collected by a honeynet system that was installed on an ISP edge router, for a four-month period. In the examined scenario, we identify and analyze malicious activities based on packets captured and analyzed by a network protocol sniffer and signature-based attack analysis tools. Our analysis shows that IoT-based DDoS attacks are one of the latest and most proliferating attack trends in network security. Based on the analysis of the attacks, we describe some mitigation techniques that can be applied at the providers' network to mitigate the trending attack vectors.
INTRODUCTION
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are of growing concern with serious effects for individual hosts and organizations of all sizes. Video streaming or VoD services, Internet of Things (IoT) devices, online games, financial exchanges and any number of websites have all been targets of a DDoS attack. Their aim is to make online resources temporarily or permanently unavailable, by flooding them with high traffic and make them inaccessible to legitimate users.
DDoS attacks also involve a high number of compromised systems and devices, that collectively consist of a botnet, controlled by some remote botmaster. Attackers build their "army" of computers by spreading malware through email, social media and various websites. In many cases, it suffices to scan for open ports and/or unprotected public services, which are unfortunately not rare in particular types of devices, such as IoT devices. Once infected, these networks of computer bots are exploited without their owners' knowledge to launch a DDoS attack against a target online service.
Internet of Things is the next big evolutionary step in the world of the Internet [1] . The increasing popularity of the IoT has made "smart" devices a powerful amplifying platform for cyber-attacks. The number of IoT devices on the Internet is expected to reach 24 billion by the year 2020 [2] . However, the poor security standards of these devices makes them susceptible to a majority of cyber-attacks.The most common trend attack in this category of attacks is Mirai botnet. Mirai scans the Internet using random IP address generation and its goal is to find and infect vulnerable IoT devices, turning them into Mirai bots, to distributedly attack the actual target. An attack like that was unleashed upon Krebs on Security website with network traffic reaching 620 Gbs [3] .
Honeynets are widely used security systems for capturing and analyzing network traffic. The main goal of a honeynet is to appear as an attractive attack target to potential adversaries, and lure them in providing to the honeynet administration useful pertained to targeted system vulnerabilities and attack trends. Honeynets can be installed to protect any type of network (such as enterprise, home network or Intranet). However, a honeynet architecture installed at the edge routers of an Internet Service Provider will provide a huge amount of data, since ISPs route the traffic for all types of networks. ISPs may use honenets as a method to early detect and/or to prevent the proliferation of both known and future (zero-day) attacks.
Honeypots and honeynets are popular tools in the area of network security. They are usually implemented as parts of larger network intrusion detection systems. First surveys in the field of honeypot research presented in 2003 include only a small subset of meanwhile available software and are by this time outdated [4] .
Authors in [2] implemented a multi-component honeypot which detects and reports telnet attacks on IoT devices. Also, authors in [5] implemented a new type of honeypot called as "intelligent-interaction". They propose an automatic and intelligent way to collect potential responses using scanner and leverage machine learning techniques to learn the correct behaviors during the interaction with attackers.
In this paper, we propose an experimental analysis of current DDoS and other distributed attacks, based on a honeynet architecture installed in an edge router of an ISP. This kind of study requires setting up a honeynet system in an effort to generate useful threat intelligence and prioritization from the captured data.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we describe the design of a honeynet system, which was installed in an ISP environment for a 4-month period. In Section III we present an experimental analysis, based on the data collected by the honeynet, using detection tools and packet analyzer sniffers and show current attack trends. Section IV presents mitigation techniques that may be applied to deal with the identified attacks, while Section V concludes the paper.
II. DESIGN OF A HONEYNET IN AN ISP NETWORK
In the following paragraphs, the primary challenges related to the design of a honeynet system in an ISP environment are firstly discussed and the set up of our honeynet network is then described.
A. Challenges to be met Before mitigating DDoS attacks, they first have to be detected. When designing a honeynet in a provider's edge router environment, several challenges must be met.
• Efficient monitoring: As networks become more complex, mesh and more distributed, monitoring network behavior is the first challenge to be met. Our honeynet topology at the edge router of the ISP will allow for efficient monitoring of various patterns of traffic that are not specific to a single type of network environment (such as enterprise or home network).
• Prevention of attack spreading: In an ISP environment, it is crucial to avoid the spreading of an attack under study, since if threat analysis in not well isolated, the attack may be easily spread to various other networks supported by the ISP. For this reason our honenet system uses a range of Dark (unused) IP addresses, that are not actually used by any real service.
• Early attack analysis and response: Raw network pcap data will be investigated to gather statistical information about the attacks. Various common packet capture and log analysis tools will be used (e.g. Wireshark), along with targeted signature-based attack analysis platforms (e.g. Arbor Networks). Due to the imperfect nature of detection, an amount of error will invariably exist (for example to detect an event that doesn't occur -False Positive type).
• Efficient mitigation: An effective system must be able to take action against an identified threat. The action taken must be able to mitigate the harmful effects of the attack and should provide some sort of attack history in case a similar attack occurs in the future.
B. Honeynet design
Our honeynet is installed in a high-speed optic network, operated by a major Internet Service Provider, which uses links with speeds of 10 Gbps and higher. The design topology is illustrated in Fig. 1 . The main idea for the experimental part of this paper is to create a virtual Linux host running Ubuntu. The host is connected to a Provider Edge Router (PER), in order to receive the packet traffic for a specific range of IP ranges.
For the implementation of the idea above, and in order to avoid attack spreading, we used a range of Dark IP addresses. This IP range is then routed towards the virtual host. A very important step before start looking for malicious traffic is the routing configuration on the PER, which has already been connected to the virtual host (1GbE interface connectivity) in order to advertise all these IPv4 ranges to the rest of the network via various protocols such as the Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP 1 ), Open Shortest Path First (OSPF 2 ) and the Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS 3 ) protocol. This was achieved by means of static routes on the PER side, which were then redistributed to the rest of the network via IGP.
Honeynets are assigned one or more unused IP addresses to monitor and usually listen on several UDP/TCP ports for incoming traf¿c. The listening UDP/TCP ports can be assigned fully functional services (e.g. HTTP, SSH, etc.) to provide some interactivity and thus permit the capture of complex attack attempts or just be used to capture network packets. In order to implement the experimental scenario, we used the following access control rules, implemented with an ACL: 1) Allow all packets from external networks to the 1 www.thenetworkencyclopedia.com/entry/interior-gateway-protocol-igp/ 2 https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/ospf/charter/ 3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IS-IS Dark internal IP addresses; 2) Deny all packets sent from the Dark internal IP addresses. In our case, the server only accepts the traffic from external networks and does not answer to the requests; 3)Record a log ¿le for all incoming packets from external networks, to be analyzed offline later. Fig. 1 . Implemented the honeynet topology in edge router
The rules have been configured at the router side. The packets which are captured from the Dark IP networks are divided into three categories:
• Port scanning or host scanning packets trying to confirm the presence of hosts and search for open ports that may be attacked.
• A backscatter of DDoS packets occurs when a host is under attack and the IP address is spoofed. In most of the cases, a backscatter packet has SYN/ACK TCP Àags on, in response to an attack of TCP SYN flag.
• Improperly configured packets that are usually caused by human mistakes. The security risk of these packets is low.
III. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
The experimental part analyzes a collection of unclassified data from a honeynet system which were gathered from July 1st to October 31st 2017 in an effort to generate useful threat intelligence and prioritization from the data. This model allows us to obtain a better understanding of threats' profiles and propose solutions to mitigate the attacks.
Before starting to analyze possible attacks, the best way is first to study how or where the possible attackers begin to launch attacks. Most of the experiment results show that they normally start with information gathering about their targets through port scanning to find open ports and vulnerabilities of their victims.
In many cases the attacks may have used forged/spoofed source IP addresses, which makes harder to identify their original source addresses. Most common observed activities were TCP, UDP and ICMP port scanning activities, by attackers that potentially attempt to enumerate the honeynet and check for more targeted vulnerabilities (e.g. at the operating system level). As expected, the highest percent of connections are UDP protocol related. This is because UDP, by design, is a connectionless protocol that does not validate source IP addresses and it is very easy to forge the IP packet datagram to include an arbitrary source IP address. When many UDP packets have their source IP address forged to the victim IP address, the destination server responds to the victim (instead of the attacker) creating a reflected DoS attack. The lowest percentage from the well-known protocols belongs to ICMP connections. Technically speaking, it wouldn't be precise referring to them as real connections since ICMP packets are not supposed to establish connections but basically control them through status and error messages.
According to Fig. 3 , a list of the most important (possible) attacks that took place in the experimental implementation of honeynet is given. The majority of these attacks were blind, thus they randomly scanned honeynet IPs and tried to compromise the open ports which are more vulnerable and exploitable. Statistics of the targeted and blind attacks show that Mirai botnet was the most serious attack with the highest percentage of 29,4% while in the second position came the SSDP reflective/amplified attack with a percentage of 16,6%. 
A. Case study: Mirai_botnet analysis
The increasing popularity of the IoT devices have made them a powerful amplifying platform for cyber-attacks. Mirai, identified in November 2016, causes a DDoS attack against a set of target servers by constantly propagating to weakly configured IoT devices. Although Mirai scans random public IP addresses through TCP ports 23 or 2323 sometimes relies on other TCP ports to commandeer devices -for example port 7547, which ISPs use to remotely manage customers' broadband routers. First analyzing Telnet-based scans on honeynet (using unused IP addresses), we recognized that the attacks (scans) on Telnet had dramatically increased.
One of the main characteristics of Mirai is that it works by brute forcing, over Telnet, weak and default credentials on devices. Once it gains controls of the device, it reports the infection to a command and control server and the device is now part of a botnet. Once many owners of devices directly and indirectly connected to the Internet never change the default username and password, so that Mirai could infect million devices. Fig. 4 , shows the distribution of port 23 over the period of four months. It can be observed that the scanning activities of Mirai have a significant peak on July. Fig. 4 . Use of telnet TCP port 23
The following example, shows the attempts of the source IP address of the attacker to scan all the hosts from a network by sending SYN packets on TCP port 23 in order to get access (if the server corresponded). 
IV. MITIGATION STRATEGIES
The tremendous amount of traffic generated by these attacks make it impossible to stop DDoS without ISP's contribution. Once a DDoS attack is detected, some actions might need to be taken.
A. Traditional DDoS mitigation techniques
A vast variety of techniques and tools are used for DDoS attack mitigation. The techniques involve mitigation using Access Control List (ACL), Rate Limiting or combination of both.
From one hand, ACLs perform packet filtering to control which packets move through the network and where. One of the most important reasons to configure access lists is to provide a basic level of security for the network by controlling access to it. Access lists are defined on a perprotocol basis. Maintaining ACLs at the network level serves to strictly control access to specific ports and protocols. This may not work great at fixing DDOS attacks on port 80, but will prevent unnecessary ports from being open. For example, telnet ports can remain closed and this will protect you for some DDOS attacks. BGP blackhole filtering [16] is another routing technique used to drop unwanted traffic. Black holes are placed in the parts of a network where unwanted traffic is routed into a "black hole" and then is dropped. When blackhole filtering is implemented without specific restriction criteria, both legitimate and malicious is routed to a null route.
Service providers prefer destination-based BGP blackholing to mitigate the damaging effects of DDoS attacks. Specifically, the ISP sets a permanent static route utilizing the unused prefix pointing to the null interface on its PE routers [10] .
A new trend and alternative method of blocking unwanted attack traffic from the network is known as BGP FlowSpec [17] . Routers that support BGP FlowSpec can match packets based on certain characteristics, such as destination prefix, source prefix, IPv4 protocol (e.g. TCP or UDP), destination port, source port and more. Matched packets can be rate-limited, dropped (i.e. rate-limiting to 0), filtered, or redirected [7] . As an example, using this technique it is possible to block a Mirai botnet attack by specifying that all TCP traffic with destination port 23 and 2323 must be dropped. Using BGP FlowSpec provides several benefits in comparison to ACLs on routers [7] . Since FlowSpec leverages the BGP control plane, an infrastructure between routers that is already in place, it requires less effort to deploy FlowSpec. Also, adding a new FlowSpec route requires less effort. There is no need to log in on all individual routers to add a new ACL, which results in less repetitive work. BGP FlowSpec is standardized while ACLs are configured in a vendor-specific manner. As such it is easier to deploy the same set of rules on routers from different vendors.
B. Mitigation approaches for IoT-based attacks
In order to inhibit scanning for vulnerable IoT devices, it is possible for broadband access network operators to implement ACLs at an appropriate point in the network topology to prohibit high-port TCP traffic destined for TCP/23, 2323, 103 on their customer access networks. Such policies would typically be implemented as ingress ACLs on the core interfaces of broadband customer aggregation gateways. To provide some security benefits of ACLs, we should face up Mirai botnet configuring ACL on the border, located at the edges of the networks, router interface so that inbound traffic or outbound traffic or both are filtered on this interface [9] .
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
DDoS attacks are still a major threat, especially due to the raise of the IoT. In this paper, we have implemented a honeynet at a high-speed network topology of an ISP and used it to gather and analyze data from real DDoS attacks. Honeynets are a powerful security mechanism to capture different types of attacks against the network and monitor efficiently the attackers' activities. A variety of different types of attacks were recorded. Among other, our honeynet faced port scanning attacks, amplification and reflection attacks, some of them are described to case studies section.
To that end, the different methods of mitigating DDoS attacks were compared.
Based on our analysis, several open issues that need to be addressed in the future have been identified. The real-time bandwidth monitoring allows the early detection of potential attacks and provides the ability to set threshold alarms and alerts for bandwidth usage. To this end real-time capture traffic should be improved.
Last but not least, the use of a centralized Network Management System (NMS) to perform attack analysis from different locations in cooperation with the ISP should be taken into consideration. The reason for that is because a NMS usually records data from network remote points and central reporting can be performed by system administrators.
